Life in Prison for Stealing $48?:
Rethinking Second-Degree Robbery as a
Strike Offense in Washington State
Jennifer Cox Shapiro†
I. INTRODUCTION
When Stevan Dozier was released from incarceration after fifteen
years, he “tried not to look at the prison behind him.”1 Instead, he ran
forward toward his wife, Lillian, and graciously thanked her for supporting him during his incarceration.2
After graduating from high school in 1979, “Dozier began getting
into trouble and abusing” cocaine.3 As his drug addiction worsened, he
became increasingly desperate to support his habit. As a result, “he was
arrested after punching a woman during a purse snatching” in 1986 and
arrested again for the same crime in 1988.4 Each purse snatching constituted a second-degree robbery conviction.5 Then, in February 1994,
Dozier pushed down a sixty-nine-year-old woman and grabbed her purse,
which resulted in his third second-degree robbery conviction.6 He was
subsequently sentenced to life in prison without parole, pursuant to
Washington State’s Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA),
commonly referred to as the “three strikes” law.
Under the POAA, second-degree robbery is considered a “strike offense.”7 In Washington, strike offenses include a variety of crimes8 from
† J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2011; Master in Teaching, University of Washington, 2005; B.A., English, University of Washington, 2003. I would like to thank the members of
the Seattle University Law Review for their assistance with this Comment. Thank you to Jeff Ellis for
his time, advice, and insight. Also, I would like to thank my parents, Bob and Karen Cox, and my
husband, Dan Shapiro, for their unwavering support and patience throughout law school.
1. Jennifer Sullivan, Freed 3-Strikes Offender is Being Watched Closely by Supporters, Critics, SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009325750_thre
estrikes11m.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(o) (2011).
8. Strike offenses include:
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first-degree promoting prostitution9 to first-degree manslaughter.10 Under
the POAA, once an offender has three separate convictions of crimes
considered strike offenses, the offender receives a mandatory sentence of
life without parole.11 Essentially, as in its baseball namesake, under the
POAA, three strikes and an offender is out. In 1993, the Washington
State legislature adopted this three strikes policy to “[r]educe the number
of serious, repeat offenders by tougher sentencing.”12 This reasoning is
grounded in the notion that repeat offenders commit a “disproportionately high volume of violent crimes.”13 For example, at the time of the
POAA’s adoption, nearly 50% of the criminals convicted in Washington
had prior criminal histories.14
“During [Dozier’s fifteen] years in prison, he held down a number
of jobs, attended drug and alcohol counseling, and joined the ‘Concerned
Lifers,’ a group of men serving life sentences who convene to discuss
social issues.”15 Dozier’s behavior in prison while serving a life sentence
without parole earned him the support of King County Prosecutor Dan
Satterberg, the judge who sentenced him to prison Brian Gain, and conservative talk-show host and three strikes coauthor John Carlson.16 After
Dozier spent years waiting and hoping, Washington Governor Christine
Gregoire granted him clemency “based upon the length of his sentence,

Assault in the second degree; assault of a child in the second degree; child molestation in
the second degree; controlled substance homicide; extortion in the first degree; incest
when committed against a child under age fourteen; indecent liberties; kidnapping in the
second degree; leading organized crime; manslaughter in the first degree; manslaughter
in the second degree; promoting prostitution in the first degree; rape in the third degree;
robbery in the second degree; sexual exploitation; vehicular assault when caused by the
operation or driving of a vehicle by a person while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or by the operation or driving of a vehicle in a reckless manner; vehicular homicide, when proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug as defined by RCW
46.61.502 or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner; any other class B felony offense with a finding of sexual motivation; and any other felony with a deadly weapon verdict under RCW 9.94A.602.
Id. §§ (a)–(t) (internal numbering omitted).
9. “A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree if he or she knowingly advances prostitution by compelling a person by threat or force to engage in prostitution or profits from
prostitution which results from such threat or force.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.070(1) (2011).
10. “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (a) He recklessly causes the
death of another person; or (b) He intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060(1) (2011).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(2)(b) (2011).
13. Edwin Meese, Three-Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 58 (1994).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(1)(b) (2011).
15. Sullivan, supra note 1.
16. Id.
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the crime he committed, and his behavior in prison.”17 Dozier is the first
“three-strikes offender to be granted clemency” in Washington.18
Following Dozier’s release in May 2009, two more three strikes lifers have been recommended for conditional clemency.19 Both AlKareem Shadeed and Michael Lee Bridges have spent fifteen years in
prison, and for both, attempting to steal a wallet was their third strike
offense that earned them a life sentence.20 Like Dozier, both men are
former drug addicts21 who have now become model prisoners.
Shadeed, now forty, was twenty-four when he was sentenced to life
in prison after attempting to steal a wallet from a high-school teacher.22
His prior strike convictions consisted of robbery, the first for $2 and the
second for less than $150.23 According to Shadeed’s attorney, the victim
of his third strike offense told Shadeed’s trial judge that “a life sentence
was a waste of the young man’s life.”24 Within his first year of incarceration, Shadeed earned his high school diploma.25 Additionally, he “took
classes in writing and business, . . . consistently attended Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and participated in a series of programs that brings
victims and offenders together.”26
Similar to Shadeed, Bridges, now forty-eight, was “an alcoholic and
cocaine addict in 1994” when he attempted “to steal a man’s wallet that
would have netted him $48.”27 He grabbed the victim’s wallet and
pushed him away with sufficient force to constitute second-degree robbery.28 Bridges had previously been convicted of second-degree robbery
in 1987 and 1989—before the POAA was even enacted.29 Accordingly,
his 1994 attempt was his third strike because the POAA is retroactive
17. Jennifer Sullivan, Clemency Recommended for 3-Strikes Offender, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec.
11, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008496057_webthreestrikes11m.html
(modified on May 8, 2009).
18. Sullivan, supra note 1; see also Kim Murphy, Washington State Revisits Three-Strikes
Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/11/nation/na-three-strikes11
(Dozier is also “the first three-strikes lifer in the nation to be pardoned.”).
19. Sara Jean Green, Clemency Recommended for 3-Strikes Offenders, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 12, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009330285_threestrikes12m.html.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Shadeed “tried to grab [the victim], threatened to kill him, and demanded money.” State v.
Shadeed, No. 35647-0-I, 1997 WL 288995, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 27, 1997). When the victim
yelled out for help, Shadeed lied and said “he had a gun and would kill him.” Id. When a car came
down the street, Shadeed ran away. Id.; see also Green, supra note 19.
23. Shadeed, 1997 WL 288995, at *5.
24. Green, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Bridges, 91 Wash. App. 102, 103, 955 P.2d 833, 834 (1998).
29. Green, supra note 19.
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and includes crimes committed prior to its enactment.30 “Since being sentenced to life in prison, Bridges has undergone drug and alcohol treatment, become a Christian and worked to be a good father to his now-16year-old son . . . .”31
For each of these men, his third and final strike was second-degree
robbery.32 “None of the three men used weapons or caused serious injury
to their victims.”33 Without the application of the POAA, these defendants would have served between fifteen months and ten years in prison
for their third second-degree robbery convictions.34 But because seconddegree robbery has been categorized as a “most serious offense” for the
purposes of the POAA, these men were sentenced to life in prison without parole—the same sentence that Gary Ridgway, the Green River Killer, received after pleading guilty to forty-nine murders.35
The Washington State legislature should remove second-degree
robbery as a final strike because of the large sentencing disparity between the POAA’s mandatory sentence of life without parole versus the
Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s sentencing range
for this offense. But second-degree robbery should remain as a first or
second strike offense to serve the goal of deterrence, and failing that, to
ensure the incarceration of offenders whose crimes escalate in violence.
This Comment begins by discussing the history of three strikes legislation both nationally and in Washington State and explains why three
strikes laws became popular in the mid-1990s. Part II also addresses the
elements and sentencing of second-degree robbery under Washington’s
current sentencing structure. Part III provides an overview of the sentencing process in Washington State, including the background of the
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission and its goals; the role of
both the governor and the Washington State Clemency and Pardons
Board in granting clemency; and the severity of life in prison without
parole. Part IV addresses why the POAA should be amended to better
align with the reality of how Washington prosecutors use second-degree
robbery as a strike offense. Part IV also assesses the disconnect between
the outcomes and the goals behind three strikes laws, and the politics
30. WASH. REV. CODE 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011).
31. Green, supra note 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. ST. OF WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
III-196 (2008) [hereinafter ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
35. Natalie Singer, If Ridgway Got Life, Would Anyone Get Death?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 31,
2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003548923_deathpenalty31m.html. Since
Ridgway’s plea deal in 2003, he pleaded guilty to a forty-ninth murder. Jennifer Sullivan, Green
River killer Ridgway pleads guilty to 49th murder, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014272411_ridgeway19m.html.

2011]

Rethinking Second-Degree Robbery as a Strike Offense

939

behind criminal sentencing legislation including Washington State Senate Bill 5292 and Senate Bill 5236.
II. BACKGROUND
Three strikes legislation became increasingly popular in the mid1990s. This Part first outlines the reasons behind the widespread emergence of three strikes legislation during this time. Next, this Part discusses how and why three strikes legislation was adopted in Washington
State as well as the goals behind the legislation. Finally, this Part concludes by discussing the elements and sentencing of second-degree robbery in Washington State.
A. The Emergence of Three Strikes Laws
1. Three Strikes Legislation Nationally
During the early 1990s, three strikes legislation was publicized as
“a new way to fight crime in America.”36 But prior to the 1990s, many
states had already enacted laws similar to three strikes laws called “habitual offender” laws.37 For example, Washington State had a Habitual
Criminal Statute38 that became ineffective after the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1981.39 The main difference between a habitual criminal statute
and a three strikes law is semantic. For example, a habitual criminal statute focuses on the “status” of the criminal if he commits a certain number of crimes; the status as a “habitual criminal” is what determines his
punishment. Conversely, a three strikes law may refer to the offender as
36. Meredith McClain, Note, “Three Strikes and You’re Out:” The Solution to the Repeat
Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 101 (1996).
37. Id.
38. The statute stated:
Every person convicted in this state of any crime of which fraud or intent to defraud is an
element, or of petit larceny, or of any felony, who shall previously have been convicted,
whether in this state or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of this state would
amount to a felony, or who shall previously have been twice convicted, whether in this
state or elsewhere, of petit larceny, or of any misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor of
which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, shall be adjudged to be an habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than ten
years. Every person convicted in this state of any crime of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, or of petit larceny, or of any felony, who shall previously have been
twice convicted, whether in this state or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of
this state would amount to a felony, or who shall previously have been four times convicted, whether in this state or elsewhere, of petit larceny, or of any misdemeanor or
gross misdemeanor of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (1909).
39. Washington’s Habitual Criminal Statute, RCW 9.92.090, is not applicable to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.900 (2011).
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being habitual, or “persistent” as in Washington, but shifts the focus
from status to the number of crimes the offender commits.
In 1993, Washington was the first state in the nation to adopt a
three strikes law, the POAA.40 The POAA was “modeled after and more
narrowly drafted than Washington’s habitual criminal statute,” 41 which
applied after the third conviction of any felony. Subsequently, between
1993 and 1995, twenty-four states and the federal government42 adopted
similar three strikes laws.43
Three strikes legislation is rooted in the notion that repeat offenders, “who represent a relatively small component of the offender population, commit a disproportionately high volume of violent crimes.”44 For
example, three strikes supporters often rely on federal statistics that show
“6 percent of criminals commit about 70 percent of all crimes.”45 Hence,
crime rates should decrease if these persistent offenders are imprisoned
for a lengthy amount of time.46 Additionally, proponents of three strikes
laws hope that offenders will be less likely to commit a crime when they
know the punishment could increase.47 A potential deterrent effect exists
when a person is convicted of a strike offense because both his counsel
and the sentencing judge will inform him of the consequences of later
strike-offense convictions. Proponents argue this deterrent effect will
reduce crime rates.48 But those offenders whose two prior strike convictions occurred before the POAA,49 like Dozier, Bridges, and Shadeed,
could not have been notified of the possible sentence that would result
from a third strike-offense conviction.50
40. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes Laws: A Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime?, A.B.A.
HUM. RTS. MAG., Spring 2002, at 3.
41. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998).
42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).
43. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2001).
44. Meese, supra note 13.
45. Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It’s Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1994,
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/15/us/a-3-strike-law-shows-it-s-not-as-simple-as-itseems.html?pagewanted=1.
46. Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social Benefits of Confining Habitual Criminals, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 59 (1999).
47. Marvell & Moody, supra note 43, at 90.
48. Scheidegger & Rushford, supra note 46, at 60.
49. If a defendant who committed a Class B felony that was a strike offense spends at least ten
consecutive years in the community after release from prison without committing another strike
offense, then the prior conviction is “washed out” and does not count toward the defendant’s offender score. State v. Failey, 165 Wash.2d 673, 678, 201 P.3d 328, 330 (2009); see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.525(2)(b) (2011).
50. The Court of Appeals of Washington Division I held that despite this lack of warning, the
POAA did not violate the ex post facto clause of either the United States or Washington State Constitutions because the POAA is only triggered upon the defendant’s third conviction, which occurred
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The surge of three strikes laws across the United States in the early
1990s occurred, in large part, in response to the murder of twelve-yearold Polly Klaas. On October 1, 1993, Klaas was kidnapped from her
home in Petaluma, California, and brutally murdered.51 At the time of her
kidnapping, Klaas was in her bedroom with two of her friends who were
spending the night for a sleepover.52 Her admitted killer,53 Richard Allen
Davis, had a long criminal history that included two prior kidnapping
convictions.54 Davis had served only half of his most recent sixteen-year
sentence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary.55 If he had served his entire sentence, Davis would have been in prison the day he kidnapped
Klaas.56 “Klaas’s murder galvanized support for the three strikes initiative”57 in California. “Shortly thereafter, people all over the United States
began demanding their legislatures pass tougher crime bills,”58 and legislatures responded with three strikes legislation.
Three strikes laws differ across the nation. For example, California’s law is broader than Washington’s regarding how a person can obtain three strikes. In Washington, each offense must be from the strikeoffense list. In contrast, in California, “only the first two convictions
need be from the state’s list of ‘strikeable’ offenses [and] any subsequent
felony counts as a third strike”59 making the law far broader than Washington’s. Nevertheless, the length of incarceration is less severe in California: twenty-five years to life in prison,60 compared to life without parole in Washington.61 But by including any felony as a third strike, California’s broad three strikes law has led to some controversial results.62
For example, in one case, the defendant’s third strike consisted of steal-

after the POAA had passed. State v. Angehrn, 90 Wash. App. 339, 343–44, 952 P.2d 195, 197
(1998).
51. People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 96, 99 (Cal. 2009). The jury found Davis guilty of firstdegree murder, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, and an attempted lewd act against a child. Id. at 94.
52. Id. at 95–96.
53. The defense conceded that the defendant had killed Klaas, but asserted that the evidence
did not show that he sexually assaulted her. Id. at 102.
54. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003); see also Davis, 208 P.3d at 102–03.
55. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14–15.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id.
58. McClain, supra note 36, at 99.
59. John Clark, James Austin & D. Alan Henry, ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out:’ Are Repeat
Offender Laws Having Their Anticipated Effects?, 81 JUDICATURE 144, 145–46 (1998).
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2010).
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011).
62. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–20 (third strike consisted of stealing three golf clubs);
Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66–68 (2003) (third strike consisted of stealing $150.00 worth of
videotapes); People v. Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 321 (Ct. App. 1995) (third strike consisted of
possessing codeine).
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ing a piece of pizza.63 Even Klaas’s father expressed shock at the “small
time crooks” who were striking out under the law,64 stating, “I’ve had my
car broken into and my radio stolen and I’ve had my daughter murdered,
and I know the difference.”65 Despite the debatable outcomes, the United
States Supreme Court has held that California’s broad three strikes law
“does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.”66
2. Three Strikes Legislation in Washington State
Similar to California’s reaction to the Polly Klaas murder, “Washington was reeling from a series of horrific crimes committed by repeat
offenders when voters passed the” POAA.67 Early supporters of the
POAA consisted of Helen Harlow “whose 7-year-old son had been
raped, choked, and sexually mutilated in 1989 by a man who had been
assaulting children for 24 years, and Ida Ballasoites, whose daughter was
abducted and murdered in 1988 while walking from her office to her car
in downtown Seattle by a man” twice jailed for sexual assault.68
In reaction to these crimes, on November 2, 1993, “voters in Washington approved the first three-strikes statute in the nation by a 3:1 margin.”69 Voters intended to “[i]mprove public safety by placing the most
dangerous criminals in prison” and to ensure punishments proportionate
“to both the seriousness of the crime and the [offender’s] prior criminal
history.”70 The POAA became effective on December 2, 1993, and
amends the Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 to define a new
type of offender, the “persistent offender,”71 and a new type of offense,
the “most serious offense,” commonly referred to as a strike offense.
63. 25 Years for a Slice of Pizza, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/
05/us/25-years-for-a-slice-of-pizza.html?scp=1&sq=%2225%20Years%20for%20a%20Slice%
20of%20Pizza%22&st=cse. The defendant stole a piece of pepperoni pizza from a group of children
at Redondo Beach, CA. He had prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, drug possession,
and unauthorized use of a vehicle. Id. His sentence of twenty-five years to life was later reduced to
six years. Jerry Dewayne Williams, 3rd Strike Theft of a Slice of Pizza, Sentence: 25 Years to Life,
Reduced to 6, THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT: STOP REPEAT OFFENDERS, http://www.three
strikes.org/calaw01.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
64. McClain, supra note 36, at 118 n.96.
65. Jennifer Edwards Walsh, “In the Furtherance of Justice”: The Effect of Discretion on the
Implementation of California’s Three Strikes Law, THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT 12 (1999),
http://www.threestrikes.org/JEWalsh.pdf.
66. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28–31.
67. Murphy, supra note 18.
68. Id.
69. Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38 (2000).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(1)(c), (2)(a) (2011).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36) (2011).

2011]

Rethinking Second-Degree Robbery as a Strike Offense

943

For a defendant to be a three strikes persistent offender, he must satisfy several requirements.72 First, the defendant must be convicted of
any felony in Washington considered a strike offense.73 Second, the defendant must have previously been convicted of a strike offense at least
twice before.74 Third, “at least one of the prior convictions must have
occurred before the commission of any of the other most serious offenses.”75 “In other words, the sequence must be: first offense, first conviction; second offense, second conviction; third offense, third conviction.”76
The POAA applies retroactively, so any strike-offense conviction
prior to December 2, 1993, comparable to a most serious offense on the
strike list counts as a strike offense.77 Furthermore, any “out-of-state and
federal convictions with titles different than, but conduct similar to,” a
listed strike offense also counts.78
B. Second-Degree Robbery in Washington State
The POAA lists over twenty strike offenses including seconddegree robbery.79 Not every state includes second-degree robbery as a
strike offense.80 In Washington, a person commits robbery if he “takes
personal property from the person of another or in his presence against
his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear
of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone.”81 A person commits first-degree robbery when, “in commission of
72. 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3514 (3d ed. 2010–2011).
73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36)(a)(ii) (2011).
75. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 3514.
76. Id.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011); see also supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
78. Daniel W. Stiller, Note/Comment, Initiative 593: Washington’s Voters Go Down Swinging,
30 GONZ. L. REV. 433, 435 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011).
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(o) (2011); see also supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
80. See infra Appendix A. Although most states do include a crime equivalent to seconddegree robbery in their habitual offender statutes, many of these states do not have such lengthy
sentences as Washington. For example, in North Dakota, the maximum term of imprisonment is ten
years for a conviction equivalent to second-degree robbery when the offender has two prior offenses.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(2) (2009). In Rhode Island, the court may sentence a habitual offender to an additional sentence with a maximum of twenty-five years. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21
(2010).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (2011). Additionally:
Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is
immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking
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the robbery or immediate flight therefrom, he or she is armed with a
deadly weapon, displays what appears to be a firearm or deadly weapon,
inflicts bodily injury, or commits robbery against a financial institution.”82 A person commits second-degree robbery in Washington if “he
commits a robbery.”83 In other words, first-degree robbery includes the
element of possession of a deadly weapon or infliction of bodily injury
whereas second-degree robbery does not. This added element is based on
the theory that the dangerousness level of a crime elevates exponentially
when a weapon is involved, even if the weapon is not used.
Second-degree robbery is a Class B felony84 along with many other
three strikes offenses.85 According to the Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines, the mandatory prison sentence after one second-degree robbery conviction is twelve to fourteen months.86 The minimum prison sentence after three separate second-degree robbery convictions is fifteen to
twenty months.87 For an attempt conviction, the offender would receive
75% of the sentencing range for the completed crime.88 In Washington,
the maximum sentence for all Class B felonies, including second-degree
robbery, is ten years89—far from the mandatory sentence of life without
parole when this crime is considered a strike offense.90
III. SENTENCING AND CLEMENCY IN WASHINGTON STATE
Removing second-degree robbery as a final strike will lead to more
consistent results under Washington’s sentencing and clemency structure. First, this Part outlines the sentencing policy under the Washington
State Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Second, this Part describes the
difficult clemency process in Washington and the role of both the goverwas fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear.
Id.
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1) (2011).
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.210 (2011).
84. Id.
85. Class B felonies on Washington’s three strikes list include second-degree assault; assault of
a child in the second degree; child molestation; child molestation in the second degree; indecent
liberties, unless committed by forcible compulsion, which increases the charge to a Class A felony;
kidnapping in the second degree, unless there is a finding of sexual motivation, which increases the
charge to Class A felony; manslaughter in the second degree; and promoting prostitution in the
second degree. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31), (36)(b)(i) (2011).
86. See ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 34.
87. Id.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.595 (2011).
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(b) (2011).
90. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the other Class B felonies listed as strike
offenses, such as second-degree assault and second-degree manslaughter, should also be removed as
third strike offenses because the sentencing disparity for these crimes under the POAA is the same as
for second-degree robbery.
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nor and the Clemency and Pardons Board in granting clemency. Additionally, it considers recent developments in Washington that further
complicate the clemency process. Lastly, this Part examines the severity
and effects of a life sentence without parole.
A. The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission
Washington is one of approximately twenty-one states with a sentencing guidelines commission.91 The Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission derives its power from the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1981,92 which directs the Commission to “evaluat[e] and monitor[] adult and juvenile sentencing policies and practices,” to recommend
modifications of these policies and practices to the governor and legislature, and to provide statistics regarding adult and juvenile sentencing.93
The Commission plays an advisory role in sentencing; however, Washington’s legislature “never delegated its power over sentencing” to the
Commission.94 Instead, the Commission serves the “valuable role” of
creating sentencing schemes and “providing policy advice” while the
legislature controls sentencing policy.95
The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission designed
the sentencing guidelines system “to ensure that offenders who commit
similar crimes and have similar criminal histories receive equivalent sentences.”96 When creating the guidelines, the Commission “ranked felonies into fourteen seriousness levels and devised a scoring system for
criminal history that assigned variable weights based on the number of
convictions, their seriousness, the similarity of the prior conviction to the
current offense, and the length of time between convictions.”97 When
applying the guidelines, the first step in determining an offender’s sentence is determining his offender score. For example, an offender who
committed second-degree robbery and who has two previous felonies
would multiply two (the number of prior felonies) by two in the “Adult
History” section below. If the offender was not on community placement
and did not have a juvenile history, his offender score would be four.
91. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 3, 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/csi/PEW-Profiles-v12-online.pdf.
92. Codified as RCW § 9.94A. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.020 (2011).
93. Powers and Duties of the Commission: Statutory Mandate, ST. OF WASH. SENT’G
GUIDELINES COMMISSION [hereinafter Powers and Duties], http://www.sgc.wa.gov/Informational/
About_SGC.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
94. David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME &
JUST. 71, 83–84 (2001).
95. Id.
96. Powers and Duties, supra note 93.
97. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 86.
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After determining the offender score, the “standard sentence range
for an offense can be determined by referring to the felony sentencing
‘grid’ and finding the intersection of the row identifying the seriousness
level of the current offense and the column identifying the appropriate
number of points in the offender’s criminal history score.”98 The standard
sentencing range for second-degree robbery ranges from “zero” to “nine
or more.” With an offender score of four, the offender’s standard sentencing range would be fifteen to twenty months in prison. “A judge may
impose a determinate sentence that falls within this standard range, or
may impose an exceptional sentence with a written explanation.”99
Washington’s sentencing “guidelines provide the external standard
necessary to constrain [judicial] discretion” because “[t]he applicable
sentence range is determined solely by the defendant’s crime of conviction and prior criminal history.”100 “Yet the Washington reformers’ intent
was to structure, not eliminate, judicial discretion, and thus the guidelines were made presumptive, not mandatory.”101 The POAA clashes
with this intent because it removes any discretion from judges.102 Already, exceptional sentences103 “must be justified by explicit findings of
98. See Powers and Duties, supra note 93.
99. Id.
100. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 123, 128.
101. Id. at 123.
102. See McClain, supra note 36, at 118–19.
103. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
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‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ and are subject to substantive
appellate review.”104 The POAA eliminates judicial discretion and, additionally, suggests that every time an offender commits a serious offense,
the circumstances are equivalent, making judicial discretion unnecessary.
In reality, even the commission of the same crime could be very different
due to innumerable factors relating to the circumstances of the offense,
for example, whether the victim is injured during the act of a seconddegree robbery.
Furthermore, the POAA shifts the sentencing burden from judges to
prosecutors,105 which contradicts the Washington sentencing guidelines’
paramount goal of sentencing consistency. Prosecutors have discretion
when determining what charges to bring against a defendant, but under
the POAA, “[i]f a person meets the definition of a persistent offender, a
life sentence must be imposed.”106 Accordingly, if a prosecutor wishes to
avoid a judge imposing a life sentence on a defendant with two strike
offenses, the prosecutor must decline to file any charge that may constitute a strike. The goal of Washington’s sentencing guidelines is neither to
remove judicial discretion entirely nor to place sentencing discretion entirely in the power of the prosecutor.107 But under the POAA, even if a
judge wanted to, she lacks “the authority to depart from the mandatory
sentence of life without the possibility of parole.”108 Though this hardline approach seems reasonable for some strike offenses, such as sexual
exploitation, rape, or manslaughter, the lack of discretion can have the
undesirable effect of imposing an overly harsh sentence on an individual
who committed a lesser crime and who may be capable of rehabilitation
such as Dozier.
B. The Washington State Clemency Process
The need for legislative intervention in eliminating second-degree
robbery as a qualifying third strike offense is made even more apparent
by examining Washington State’s clemency process. Petitioning for clemency is a slow and arduous process that is rarely successful in Washington, particularly in recent years.
Clemency is a broad term that includes “the power of the President
or a governor to pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence.”109 A
pardon eliminates the sentence “or other legal consequences of the
104. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 128 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2001)).
105. Stiller, supra note 78, at 456.
106. State v. Bridges, 91 Wash. App. 102, 105, 955 P.2d 833, 834 (1998).
107. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 118, 123.
108. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998).
109. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 107 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
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crime.”110 In contrast, when governors commute an offender’s sentence,
they substitute “a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has
already been judicially imposed . . . .”111
In Washington, the governor has the sole power “to grant a pardon
to a person convicted of a crime . . . .”112 For offenders sentenced for
crimes committed after the implementation of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1981—July 1, 1984—the Clemency and Pardons Board “receives
the petitions for pardons and for review and commutations of sentences
and makes recommendations to the governor.”113 The Clemency and
Pardons Board was statutorily “established as a board within the office of
the governor.”114 “The board consists of five members appointed by the
governor” and confirmed by the state senate.115
The first hurdle that prisoners must overcome when seeking clemency in Washington is finding representation. Washington State “does
not provide public defenders for clemency petitioners,” and prisoners
convicted of second-degree robbery likely have limited funds, so finding
an attorney can be incredibly difficult.116 The prisoners who are most
likely to afford representation are those that are supported by financially
sound and supportive family and friends.117 Accordingly, disparity exists
between who can afford representation and who cannot. Due to lack of
representation, many clemency petitions are written pro se by prisoners
lacking both legal expertise and access to legal resources.
After a prisoner submits a clemency petition, the Clemency and
Pardons Board reviews it and recommends to the governor whether to
grant or deny clemency.118 The board cannot make a recommendation
“that the governor grant clemency . . . until a public hearing has been
held on the petition.”119 To start the process of a public hearing, a copy of
the petition is sent to the prosecuting attorney of the county where the
offender was convicted.120 Then, the prosecuting attorney must “make
110. Id. at 520.
111. Id. at 120.
112. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 5301.
113. Id.
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.880(1) (2011). Additionally:
Members of the board shall serve terms of four years and until their successors are appointed and confirmed. However, the governor shall stagger the terms by appointing one
of the initial members for a term of one year, one for a term of two years, one for a term
of three years, and two for terms of four years.
Id. § (2). Members of the board do not receive compensation. Id. § (4).
115. Id. § (1).
116. Murphy, supra note 18.
117. Interview with Jeff Ellis, Attorney for Stevan Dozier, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 3, 2010).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885(1) (2011).
119. Id. § (3).
120. Id.
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reasonable efforts to notify victims, survivors of victims, witnesses, and
the law enforcement agency or agencies that conducted the investigation
of the date and place of the hearing.”121 After the hearing, the Clemency
and Pardons Board decides whether to recommend the petitioner for
clemency. Clemency is rarely recommended.122
Even if the clemency board does recommend clemency, the governor ultimately decides if it is granted.123 Placing clemency in the hands of
the governor can lead to unpredictable outcomes because, like any political decision,124 the likelihood that any particular governor will follow the
Clemency and Pardons Board recommendations for clemency varies.
Washington’s current governor, Christine Gregoire, rarely grants clemency when compared to her predecessors.125 Furthermore, Governor
Gregoire is not required to give any explanation for her decision.126 But
on some occasions, she may encourage the prisoner to reapply for clemency, which may provide some guidance for prisoners who she determines may need more rehabilitation.127
Although Governor Gregoire has always been hesitant to grant
clemency,128 a recent tragedy makes it less likely that she will do so in
the future. On the early morning of November 29, 2009, Maurice Clem121. Id.
122. For example, Governor Gregoire was elected in 2004, and by June 2007, twenty-six prisoners had petitioned for clemency. The Clemency and Pardons Board only recommended to grant
four prisoners clemency. The governor then denied three of those and approved one. Tracy Johnson,
He Began a New Life While Still Behind Bars, Hopes for Clemency, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
July 22, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/324703_clemency23.html.
123. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 5301. Not every state places the sole clemency
power in the office of the governor. Most states do, but, for example, Georgia’s Board of Pardons
and Paroles makes a decision entirely independent of Georgia’s governor. Jake Armstrong, Clemency Board Keeps Its Secrets, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.jacksonville.com/tuonline/stories/091408/geo_332001750.shtml.
124. Further complicating the issue are the drastic effects that clemency can have on a governor’s reelection. For example, Willie Horton, a convicted murderer, was not granted clemency from
his life sentence. But in 1986 he was released for a weekend-furlough program during which time he
raped a woman and brutally stabbed her fiancé. Then-Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis did
not start the furlough program but he had supported it. His opponent in the 1988 presidential campaign, George H.W. Bush, repeatedly brought up his support for the program in debates and an
aggressive media campaign that many attribute to Dukakis’s loss. Nina Shapiro, Gov. Gregoire: One
Tough Clemency Judge, SEATTLE WKLY., July 4, 2007, http://www.seattleweekly.com/2007-0704/news/gov-gregoire-one-tough-clemency-judge.php/3.
125. Robert Winsor, a former King County Superior Court and state Court of Appeals judge
who served twelve years on the board, states, “Gov. Locke and Gov. [Mike] Lowry usually accepted
our recommendations . . . . ‘Almost always’ might be the right word. I do think that Gov. Gregoire
thus far has not followed our recommendations that often.” Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Johnson, supra note 122.
128. Governor Gregoire has only granted 26 of the 215 requests she has received while in
office. Nina Shapiro, Gregoire to Be Even Tougher on Clemency?, SEATTLE WKLY, Dec. 2, 2009,
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2009-12-02/news/gregoire-to-be-even-tougher-on-clemency/.
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mons walked into a coffee shop in Lakewood, Washington, and opened
fire on four uniformed police officers as they sat working on their laptops.129 All four officers died at the scene.130 A two-day manhunt revealed surprising and concerning details about Clemmons’s criminal history. Originally from Arkansas, Clemmons had a long history of committing violent crimes, “including pending felony charges of raping a 12year-old relative and assaulting police officers.”131 Prior to moving to
Washington, he had been serving a ninety-five year prison sentence in
Arkansas, but in 2000, then-Governor Mike Huckabee granted him clemency after only eleven years.132 The recent murders of the four Lakewood police officers will undeniably increase public scrutiny of Governor Gregoire’s future decisions and serve as a reminder of the risks involved when granting clemency.133
Inarguably, clemency should not be easy for a prisoner to attain,
otherwise the state’s sentencing structure would become moot. But when
defendants are sentenced inconsistently or unfairly, as Dozier, Shadeed,
and Bridges, the inability to overcome the clemency process can prevent
them from attaining freedom after they have been rehabilitated.
C. The Severity of Life in Prison Without Parole
Second only to the death penalty, life without parole134 is the most
severe sentence a court may impose.135 Both prisoners136 and scholars
129. William Yardley, Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/200
9/12/01/us/01tacoma.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.html.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Shapiro, supra note 128. For example, in December 2010, Governor Gregoire overrode
the decision of the state parole board to release Jerry Dean Lain, who attempted to kill a Richland
Police Officer in 1982. Jacques von Lunen, Governor Blocks Release of Convict, THE NEWS TRIB.,
Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.thenewstribune.com/2010/12/18/1470195/governor-blocks-release-ofconvict.html.
134. The Washington Pattern Jury Instructions on life without parole state:
A person sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole shall
not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any judicial officer. The Indeterminate Sentence Review Board or its successor may not parole such prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever including but not limited to
any sort of good-time calculation. The Department of Corrections or its successor or any
executive official may not permit such prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program.
11 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PRACTICE:
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL § 31.06 (3d ed. 2010).
135. Catherine Appleton & Bent Grover, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole, 47 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 598 (2007).
136. Gerald Hankerson was sentenced to life without parole at age eighteen for aggravated
first-degree murder. On April 9, 2009, he became the first man in Washington State history to be
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argue that life without parole may be as severe as the death penalty because “to lock up a prisoner and take away all hope of release is to resort
to another form of the death sentence” with no goal of freedom, resocialization, or repayment of debt to society.137 Instead, the goal is solely incapacitation. The sentence reflects society’s view that these individuals
are so beyond rehabilitation that permanently removing them from society is the only viable option. The severity of life imprisonment without
parole has been recognized internationally. For example, constitutional
courts in Germany,138 France, Italy, and Namibia, have posited that prisoners subjected to life sentences “have a fundamental right to be considered for release.”139 But most states, such as Washington, employ life
without the possibility of parole as a possible sentence.
In Washington, aggravated first-degree murder is the only crime
that mandates140 the punishment of life without parole, which illustrates
the harshness of this punishment. When a defendant is found guilty of
aggravated first-degree murder, the jury first must find the defendant
guilty of premeditated141 murder in the first degree.142 Then, the jury determines whether one or more “aggravating factors” applies, for example, if the victim was a law enforcement officer or the defendant committed the murder in order to receive money.143 The Washington State legislature recognizes the severity of this crime not only by mandating life
without parole but also by allowing capital punishment to be imposed.144
Comparing the elements of aggravated first-degree murder, where the
defendant intends to take a life, to second-degree robbery, where violence may be only threatened, highlights the inconsistencies in mandating life without parole for both crimes.
granted clemency after being sentenced to life without parole. When he was nineteen years old and
in solitary confinement in Walla Walla State Penitentiary, he recalls the death-row inmates told him
“I was the unlucky one; they got to die, I had to spend the rest of my life in misery in prison.” Damon Agnos, In an About-Face, Gregoire Commutes Sentence, Apr. 15, 2009, SEATTLE WKLY.,
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2009-04-15/news/in-an-about-face-gregoire-commutes-sentence/.
137. Appleton & Grover, supra note 135, at 606, 610.
138. In 1977, the German Federal Constitutional Court recognized that human dignity is compromised if a prisoner has no hope of being released. Accordingly, there is no life imprisonment
without parole under German law. Id. at 610.
139. Id.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(1) (2011). Unless there are significant mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence for aggravated first-degree murder is the death penalty. Id.
§ (2). If sufficient mitigating circumstances exist, then the sentence is life without parole. See id.
§ (1)–(2).
141. “[T]he premeditation required in order to support a conviction of the crime of murder in
the first degree must involve more than a moment in point of time.” WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.32.020(1) (2011).
142. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (2011).
143. Id. § (1), (4).
144. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2011).
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In addition to sentencing inconsistency, a compelling economic argument exists for the state to reduce the number of prisoners serving life
without parole. According to the Washington State Department of Corrections, housing an offender in a Washington State prison costs nearly
$37,000 per year.145 These costs may increase as prisoners get older because “an older inmate population will have a higher incidence of circulatory, respiratory, dietary, and ambulatory difficulties than younger inmates . . . .”146 Releasing prisoners after they have passed the age where
they commit the most crimes could save Washington State a considerable
amount of money. Even three strikes supporters assert that life without
parole may be too harsh a punishment for repeat offenders because they
often stop committing crimes in middle or advanced age.147
IV. ELIMINATING SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY AS A FINAL STRIKE
To ensure consistent sentencing and promote prisoner rehabilitation, second-degree robbery should be removed as a third strike option.
First, this Part discusses how Washington prosecutors have exercised
discretion regarding second-degree robbery convictions since the adoption of the POAA. The Part next addresses the disparity between the outcomes of three strikes legislation and the policy behind it. Lastly, this
Part examines why removing second-degree robbery entirely from the
strike list is not a realistic option due to the politics of criminal sentencing.
A. The Reality of Three Strikes in Washington
Although defendants like Stevan Dozier present extreme examples
of the shortcomings of three strikes legislation, many cases exist where
this hard-line approach has led to the incarceration of violent and dangerous repeat offenders.148 For example, Lonnie Tenant’s first two strikes
included second-degree assault and first-degree burglary.149 His third
strike conviction included second-degree child molestation, and second-

145. Sullivan, supra note 1.
146. Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You’re Out!: The Political Sentencing Game, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 7 (Mar. 1995).
147. One author argues the punishment should be “[twenty-five] years to life with provisions
for release of those who have served [twenty-five] or more years if correctional officials certify they
are no longer dangerous” in his article that promotes three strikes laws. Meese, supra note 13.
148. See WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION, TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES:
PERSISTENT OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE THROUGH JUNE 2008 (2009) [hereinafter TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES].
149. State v. Tennant, No. 28953-9-II, 2003 WL 22890423, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
2003).
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degree rape of a thirteen-year-old.150 He is currently serving a sentence of
life without parole under the POAA. Washington’s POAA undeniably
protects the public from offenders such as Tenant.151 Furthermore, the
POAA has not significantly increased the prison population, which many
feared would be a negative result of the law.152
Despite these positive results, use of both the POAA as well as
second-degree robbery as a strike offense has decreased in Washington
since the law’s 1994 implementation, most likely due to increased
awareness of its extreme consequences.153 For example, in 1995, thirtyseven offenders were sentenced under the POAA compared to eighteen
in 2007.154 Also, since 1994, three strikes convictions where seconddegree robbery was the third strike have decreased considerably.155 In
1994, Washington State prosecutors charged second-degree robbery as a
third strike in eight of fourteen three strikes cases that resulted in life imprisonment.156 Currently, the last three strikes case where a seconddegree robbery conviction was the third strike was in 2005.157 In 1994
and 1995 combined, seven offenders whose strike convictions consisted
of three second-degree robberies were sentenced to life in prison.158 In
comparison, since 1995, only ten offenders have been sentenced to life
without parole under the POAA for three second-degree robbery convictions.159 Additionally, in November 2005, Pierce County was the last
prosecutor’s office to sentence a persistent offender to life in prison for
three second-degree robbery convictions.160 In light of these statistics, it
seems highly unlikely that defendants like Dozier, Bridges, or Shadeed
would receive the same sentence for their crimes today that they received
in 1994.
The sentencing statistics reflect that prosecutors are rethinking their
charges because of the severity of a mandated sentence of life without
150. Id.
151. See also State v. Loggins, No. 24644-9-II, 2001 WL 789711, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July
13, 2001) (first strike consisted of felony assault, second strike consisted of felony assault, third
strike consisted of first-degree murder); State v. Scherf, No. 16633-3-III, 1999 WL 44480, at *1
(Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1999) (first strike was conviction for second-degree assault, second strike
was conviction for rape in the first degree and assault in the first degree, third strike was conviction
for first-degree rape, first-degree kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm).
152. Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics
and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 458 (2009).
153. See TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES, supra note 148.
154. Id. at 3, 7–8.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id. at 4–7.
160. Id. at 7.
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parole. King County Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg states that
King County prosecutors “have exercised more discretion as we’ve had
experience with the law.”161 As a result, Satterberg’s “office rarely uses
[second-degree robbery] as a third strike.”162 Instead, King County prosecutors often charge first-degree theft,163 which will not result in a life
sentence if the defendant already has two prior strikes.164 “While Satterberg [] doesn’t support the removal of second-degree robbery from the
three-strikes list,”165 he does “believe[] there are people serving a life
sentence who should no longer be incarcerated.”166 Accordingly, he has
asked a group of King County Senior Deputy Prosecutors “to review
three-strikes cases filed between 1994 and 1997 to make sure the sentence of life without parole fit the crime.”167 He also spoke in front of
Washington’s Pardon and Clemency Board in support of clemency for
Dozier, Shadeed, and Bridges.168
Satterberg’s reflective stance exemplifies the heart of this issue—
Washington’s three strikes law was not meant for men like Dozier but
has unjustly been applied to them. Second-degree robbery is on the
strike-offense list with violent crimes such as rape and manslaughter, yet
second-degree robbery often lacks the harm to victims associated with
these crimes.169 Satterberg referred to Dozier’s second-degree robberies
as “street robberies” that “did not cause extraordinary harm to anybody.”170 But street robberies fall under robbery in the second degree, a
crime where violence is only threatened but not necessarily used.171 Additionally, three strikes supporters posit that for three strikes offenders,
“rehabilitation is no longer working and jail is the only alternative.”172
But offenders like Dozier prove that this theory is incorrect.

161. Murphy, supra note 18.
162. Sullivan, supra note 1.
163. Theft in the first degree:
A person is guilty of theft in the first degree if he or she commits theft of: (a) Property or
services which exceed(s) five thousand dollars in value other than a firearm as defined in
RCW 9.41.010; (b) Property of any value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW
9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, taken from the person of another; or (c) A search and rescue
dog, as defined in RCW 9.91.175, while the search and rescue dog is on duty.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.030(1) (2011).
164. Sullivan, supra note 17.
165. Sullivan, supra note 1.
166. Sullivan, supra note 17.
167. Sullivan, supra note 1.
168. Id.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31) (2011).
170. Murphy, supra note 18.
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (2011).
172. McClain, supra note 36, at 125.
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Furthermore, sentencing an offender to life without parole does not
address the social causes of second-degree robbery. Second-degree robbery is an economic crime, and money for drugs is often the cause of the
offense,173 as was the case for Dozier, Bridges, and Shadeed.174 Lowlevel, economic crimes, such as second-degree robbery, increase in times
of economic stress like the present.175 But sentencing these offenders to
life in prison does not prevent crime because it does not eliminate its
causes, for example, drug addiction, poverty, or homelessness.176 The
money the state spends on incarcerating offenders who are past the age
where they are likely to offend could be used to create social programs to
eliminate the causes of economic crimes such as second-degree robbery.177 By continuing to apply second-degree robbery as a third and final strike, Washington State will not eliminate second-degree robbery,
but instead, will only increase its jail population.
B. Disparity Between Support and Results of Three Strikes Laws
The shift of the use of second-degree robbery as a third strike in
King County elucidates one of the most problematic issues with three
strikes legislation, which is a disconnect between the law and the implications of applying it. Put simply, three strikes legislation looks good on
paper, but creates troubling results. Despite overwhelming support for
three strikes laws,178 “it is questionable, however, whether citizens truly
wish” for them to apply to every qualifying offender.179
For example, in a 1995 survey in the Cincinnati area, people
showed “extensive support” for three strikes legislation.180 But in the
second portion of the survey, the respondents rated specific vignettes that
included a series of three crimes “that would make the offender eligible
for a mandatory life sentence.”181 The offenses were taken “from a threestrikes statute then pending in the Ohio legislature.”182 While 88% of the
sample stated they supported a three strikes law,183 “only 16.9% assigned
173. Trevor Bennett & Katy Holloway, The Causal Connection Between Drug Misuse and
Crime, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY, 513, 515, 521 (2009).
174. Green, supra note 19.
175. S. B. Rep. 5292, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2009).
176. McClain, supra note 36, at 125.
177. See id. at 120, 126.
178. A 1994 Time/CNN Poll found that 81% of adults favored mandatory life imprisonment
for anyone convicted of a third serious crime. Cullen et al., supra note 69, at 38.
179. Id. at 38–39.
180. Id. at 39.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. Approximately 52.1% “strongly” supported passing the law and 36.3% “somewhat
supported” passing the three strikes law. Id.
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a life sentence” in the vignettes they were shown.184 Furthermore, past
criminal record had “little, if any effect” on the respondents’ sentencing
choices.185 Additionally, a majority of the respondents favored making
exceptions to imposing a mandatory life sentence “when a third offense
was relatively minor . . . .”186
This study shows that while there may be agreement that dangerous
people should be removed to protect society, confusion exists over who
these offenders are and what their punishment should be.187 In Washington, the people voted to remove the “most serious offenders” from the
streets.188 But did they know they would be incarcerating Bridges for life
for attempting to steal a wallet?189 Did voters consider that if Washington’s three strikes legislation was approved, a man like Dozier would
receive the same sentence as the Green River Killer? These results are
inconsistent with the goals of both the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
to ensure sentencing consistency, and three strikes legislation, to protect
society from the most dangerous offenders. Strong support behind three
strikes may be sometimes incompatible with its outcome,190 and when
the sentence is as severe as life without the possibility of parole, this conflict creates immeasurable harm to offenders sentenced unfairly.
C. The Politics of Criminal Sentencing
Like many criminal sentencing laws, there has been debate regarding three strikes legislation with specific opposition to the inclusion of
second-degree robbery as a strike offense in Washington. For example,
in 2009, Washington State Senator Adam Kline introduced Senate Bill
5292,191 which would have removed second-degree robbery from the
three strikes list.192 The Bill stated that any offender who was sentenced
as a persistent offender would have a resentencing hearing if any of her
three strikes convictions consisted of second-degree robbery.193 Proponents of Senate Bill 5292 argued that prosecutors recognize the disparity
between the sentencing guidelines for second-degree robbery and the
three strikes sentence for this “low level offense that often does not in184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 39–40.
188. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555 (2011).
189. See State v. Bridges, 91 Wash. App. 102, 103, 955 P.2d 833, 834 (1998).
190. Cullen et al., supra note 69, at 38.
191. Senate Bill 5292 was originally sponsored by Senator Kline, Senator Craig Pridemore,
Senator James Hargrove, Senator Jeanne Kohl-Welles, Senator Debbie Regala, and Senator Joe
McDermott. S.B. 5292, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
192. See Sullivan, supra note 1.
193. S. B. Digest 5292, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
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volve physical harm.”194 Furthermore, although the Clemency and Pardons Board exists, the governor has the ultimate authority in granting
clemency, and Bill supporters recognized “this is something that is not
done lightly.”195
Despite these claims, the Bill ultimately failed.196 The failure is unsurprising because “taking a tough stance on sentencing” is often seen as
“symbolic of doing something about crime” regardless of the actual consequences.197 Essentially, politicians understand that supporting tough
sentencing proposals works for them politically.198 In the past, crime was
an issue associated with the Republicans, but then the Democrats realized that supporting tougher sentencing garnered them strong political
support.199 Now, neither party wants to be soft on crime because of the
possible disastrous campaign effects.200 Due to the divisive politics of
criminal sentencing, removing second-degree robbery only as a final
strike is a more realistic proposition than removing second-degree robbery entirely from the strike-offense list.
Additionally, it is unrealistic to expect the legislature to remove
second-degree robbery from the strike-offense list entirely where a defendant’s use of violence increased with each offense. For example,
Louis Barrow fits the description of a serious offender. In 1993, he was
convicted of first-degree robbery, and in 1987, he was convicted of attempted second-degree robbery.201 In 1999, a woman contacted the police after finding a stranger, Barrow, in her home.202 Police gave chase to
Barrow as he drove a stolen pickup truck, accelerated, ran red lights, and
eventually collided with another driver who died at the scene.203 Barrow
then fled the site of the fatal collision.204 He was convicted of seconddegree murder for killing the innocent driver, and this strike offense was
his third and final.205 He is now serving life in prison without parole under the POAA, but this sentence is also the statutory maximum for
second-degree murder.206 Hence, a judge may have sentenced Barrow to

194. S. B. Rep. 5292, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2009).
195. Id.
196. Sullivan, supra note 1.
197. See Benekos & Merlo, supra note 146, at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3–4.
200. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
201. State v. Barrow, No. 45346-7-I, 2002 WL 205402, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2002).
202. Id. at *1.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *2–3.
206. ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 34, at III-155.
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life in prison based on the circumstances of the offense, not the mandatory sentence dictated by the POAA.
Although Dozier’s story identifies the problems with second-degree
robbery as a strike offense, Barrow’s conviction shows that leaving this
crime as a strike offense will remove some of society’s repeat offenders
whose crimes escalate in violence. Politicians will be wary of removing
second-degree robbery entirely because there are other offenders such as
Barrow that have been punished under the law.207 Accordingly, the goals
of the POAA will still be attained by removing second-degree robbery
only as a final strike.
D. Senate Bill 5236
Senator Kline recently introduced another bill reforming the three
strikes law—Senate Bill 5236. If passed, the Bill would amend the
POAA so that a persistent offender who does not have a prior or current
Class A felony or sex offense would receive a minimum of fifteen years
in prison208 and a maximum term of life without parole.209 After the offender serves his minimum sentence, he would petition the Indeterminate
Sentence Review Board (ISRB) 210 for conditional release. 211 In order for
the ISRB to grant him conditional release, “the offender must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that his or her rehabilitation is complete
and that he or she is fit for release.”212
If passed, Senate Bill 5236 would solve some of the problems
created by including second-degree robbery as a strike offense. For example, the Bill acknowledges that not all three strikes offenders deserve

207. See State v. Britton, No. 17004-7-III, 2000 WL 217738, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 24,
2000) (defendant’s first two strike offenses consisted of second-degree robbery and his third strike
was first-degree murder); State v. Quarles, No. 15823-3-III, 1998 WL 17683, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 20, 1998) (defendant’s first strike was for first-degree robbery, his second strike was for seconddegree robbery, and his third strike was for first-degree murder).
208. The minimum term must be the greater of: (1) fifteen years; (2) the high end of the standard range for the current offense; or (3) an exceptional sentence above the standard range pursuant
to RCW 9.94A.535. S.B. 5236 § 1 (2)(b), 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
209. Id.
210. The ISRB was created in 1986 and is responsible for two types of offenders: (1) felony
offenders who committed crimes before July 1, 1984, and went to prison and (2) a select group of
sex offenders who committed offenses after August 31, 2001. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
REVIEW BOARD, http://www.srb.wa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). The ISRB takes into account
“the offender’s crime, past and present behavior, and possible risks” when determining whether he is
eligible for release. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING REVIEW BOARD, About Us,
http://www.srb.wa.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
211. S.B. 5236 § 3(1), 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
212. Id.
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the same sentence,213 and the opportunity to be released would provide
incentive for inmates to rehabilitate themselves. Also, an inmate does not
need legal representation or knowledge in order to petition to the ISRB
because the petition only details the offender’s behavior in prison.214
Lastly, the Bill is retroactive, so offenders who received three seconddegree robbery convictions when the POAA was initially passed could
petition for release after they serve fifteen years.
Despite the potential positive outcomes of Senate Bill 5236, it does
not apply to an offender whose third strike offense is second-degree robbery if he has only one Class A felony conviction. Essentially, an offender will still receive life in prison for a second-degree robbery conviction.
Under this Bill, an inmate who committed one Class A felony prior to
1994 and one Class B felony prior to 1994, and then earned a seconddegree robbery conviction in 2011 could earn a life sentence. This outcome does not align with the POAA’s goal of placing the most dangerous offenders in prison because the offender’s crimes are decreasing in
violence. While the Bill may be drafted narrowly to increase the chance
that it will pass,215 it does not address the sentencing disparity created by
including second-degree robbery as a third strike.
V. CONCLUSION
Many who supported Stevan Dozier, such as King County Prosecutor Dan Satterberg and Governor Christine Gregoire, are watching his
progress.216 No one would condone Dozier’s past crimes, but his story
proves that defendants sentenced to life under the POAA can be rehabilitated and contribute positively to society. Since being freed from prison,
“Dozier spends his days pounding the streets—visiting politicians, community centers and school district offices in search of an opportunity to
share his story” with young children who may be following a path of
drugs and crime.217 Dozier also testified at the public hearing in the senate committee in support of Senate Bill 5236.218 Although Dozier says
he does not dwell on the pressure, he must know that the freedom of

213. If passed, the amended three strikes law would allow the criminal justice system “to distinguish between the least of the worst and the worst of the worst.” S. B. Rep. 5236, 62nd Leg., Reg.
Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2011).
214. Interview with Jeff Ellis, Attorney for Stevan Dozier, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 3, 2010).
215. “This is a conservative bill and applies to less than 5 percent of those who are locked up.”
S. B. Rep. 5236, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2011).
216. Sullivan, supra note 1.
217. Id.
218. S. B. Rep. 5236, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2011).
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Shadeed, Bridges, and other three strike inmates with similar conviction
histories rests on his shoulders.
The POAA should be amended to exclude second-degree robbery
as a final strike. This amendment to the POAA should be retroactive to
ensure that inmates sentenced unfairly when the POAA first passed could
be released. The Washington Sentencing Guidelines provide adequate
sentencing ranges for second-degree robbery, and a second-degree robbery conviction where the offender has been convicted of two prior felonies already carries a longer sentence based on the defendant’s offender
score. Hence, the Guidelines already provide longer sentences for recidivists.
Life without parole for a second-degree robbery conviction contradicts the goal of consistent sentencing that the Washington Sentencing
Reform Act demands and does not align with the POAA’s paramount
objective to remove the most dangerous offenders from society. If
passed, Senate Bill 5236 would resolve some of the sentencing disparities created by including specific Class B felonies as strike offenses, but
it would still mandate a sentence of life without parole for a seconddegree robbery conviction if the offender had only one Class A felony
conviction. Accordingly, the POAA should be amended so that judges
retain discretion when sentencing a defendant whose final strike offense
is second-degree robbery.

Appendix A
Persistent or Habitual Offender Sentencing
in the United States
STATES THAT INCLUDE SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY
AS A STRIKE OFFENSE:
Alabama – ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (2010)
Arkansas – ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (West 2010)
California – CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2010)
Florida – FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2010)
Hawaii – HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (West 2010)
Idaho – IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (2010)
Indiana – IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2010)
Kansas – KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (West 2010)
Kentucky – KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2010)
Louisiana – LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (2010)
Maryland – MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West 2010)
Michigan – MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.11 (2010)
Mississippi – MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (2010)
Missouri – MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (West 2010)
Montana – MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (2009)
Nebraska – NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2010)
Nevada – NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (West 2009)
New Jersey – N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44–3 (West 2011)
New Mexico – N.M. STAT. ANN. 31-18-17 (West 2010)
North Carolina – N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.1 (West 2010)
North Dakota – N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (2009)
Pennsylvania – 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(a)(2) (West 2010)
Rhode Island – R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (2010)
South Dakota – S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (2010)
Tennessee – TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-107 (West 2010)
Texas – TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2009)
Utah – UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2010)
Virginia – VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (West 2010)
Washington –WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36) (2011)
Wyoming – WYO. STATE. ANN. § 6-10-201 (West 2010)
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STATES THAT EXCLUDE SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY
AS A STRIKE OFFENSE:
Arizona – ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-706 (2011)
Colorado – COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (West 2010)
Connecticut – CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (2011)
Georgia – GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (West 2010)
New York – N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (McKinney 2010)
South Carolina – S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (2010)

